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"And remember . . . don't be evil, and if you see something that you think isn't
right-speak up!"-Unofficial Slogan from Code of Conduct for Google, Inc.1
Every day millions of web users peer into the vast beyond of their proximate familiari-
ties through the use of various internet search engines. These gatekeepers of information
allow a remote user in Dallas, Texas to view news from the Middle East, sports scores
from the United Kingdom, and stock market information from China. One such gate-
keeper and world-renowned search engine servicer, Google, continues to make interna-
tional headlineS2 by providing, often to the detriment of governments, access to free-
flowing information at the click of a button.3 Although Google is a U.S.-based company
* John Sokatch is a May 2012 J.D. Candidate at the Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law. He graduated cum laude at the University of Oklahoma in May 2008 with a B.A. in Economics. John
would like to give a special thanks to Professor Christopher H. Hanna and Professor Anthony Daddino for
their guidance throughout this entire process. With eternal thanks and gratitude I dedicate this comment to
my family and friends, especially my mother, Karen Ebling, my father, David Sokatch, and both
grandmothers, Carolyn Trest and Carol Sokatch, for all of their continued support during my years in
undergrad and law school. My dog Shiner and I truly love and appreciate you all.
1. See Google.com, Code of Conduct, http://investor.google.com/corporate/code-of-conduct.html#VII
(last visited Feb. 28, 2011) ("The Google Code of Conduct is one of the ways we put "Don't be evil" into
practice. It's built around the recognition that everything we do in connection with our work at Google will
be, and should be, measured against the highest possible standards of ethical business conduct. We set the bar
that high for practical as well as aspirational reasons: Our commitment to the highest standards helps us hire
great people, who then build great products, which in turn attract loyal users.").
2. See Julianne Pepitone, Google Search Working Again in China, CNNMONEY, July 30, 2010, http://
money.cnn.com/2010/07/29/technology/googleschinalindex.htm.
3. See Google, Corporate Information, http://www.google.com/intl/en/corporate/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2011) ("Google's mission is to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and
useful.").
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whose worldwide operations are subject to local and federal U.S. taxation laws, 4 its cross-
border transactions have significantly minimized its tax bill to Uncle Sam.5
Consider the following: Consumer A (a non-U.S. citizen) and Corporation Y (incorpo-
rated outside the jurisdiction of the United States) contract to do business, whereby A
purchases widgets from Y for a certain value. Under general U.S. tax principles, Y's rec-
ognized income would be subject to tax in the jurisdiction in which the transaction oc-
curred or the place of Y's incorporation.6 As such, this transaction would generally not
qualify as a taxable event subject to U.S. taxation rates.7 Nonetheless, U.S. lawmakers
have enacted a long-arm statute that broadly characterizes this situation as a taxable event
in the case where Corporation Y is a wholly owned subsidiary of a domestic U.S. company
with shareholders residing within the United States.8 To avoid this result, multi-national
corporations take advantage of legal tax havens in the form of off-shore entities that en-
able them to defer taxes on their income earned from foreign-based entities.9 Congres-
sional attempts to curb such behavior have largely proven to be fruitless,' 0 as the number
of corporations implementing similar tax maneuvers appears to be increasing every year."
B. THE ISSUE
The Internal Revenue Code dictates that U.S. corporations pay the standard corporate
tax of 35% on profits earned domestically and abroad, one of the highest corporate tax
rates in the world.12 In October 2010, however, Bloomberg.com reported that Google
reduced its overseas tax rate to 2.4%, resulting in a $60 billion loss to the U.S. govern-
ment and harsh criticism from politicians for Google's injurious, although technically le-
gal, use of international tax loopholes.13 Google accomplished this feat by utilizing an
4. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2011); Google, About Us, http://www.google.com/int/en/contact/ (last visited Feb.
28, 2011).
5. Jesse Drucker, Google 2.4% Rate Shows how $60 Billion Lostto Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 21, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-revenue-lost-to-
tax-loopholes.html.
6. See I.R.C. § 61(a). (short form statute)
7. See I.R.C. § 954(d)(1)(A) (2011); Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(2) (as amended in 2002) ("Foreign base com-
pany sales income does not include income derived in connection with the purchase and sale of personal
property (or purchase or sale of personal property on behalf of a related person) in a transaction described in
subparagraph (1) of this paragraph if the property is manufactured, produced, constructed, grown, or ex-
tracted in the country under the laws of which the controlled foreign corporation which purchases and sells
the property (or acts on behalf of a related person) is created or organized.").
8. See I.R.C. §§ 951, 952(a)(2), 954(a)(2) (2011).
9. See Craig M. Boise, Breaking Open Offihore Piggybanks: Deferral and the Utility of Amnesty, 14 GEo.
MASON L. REv. 667, 667-68 (2007):
Most U.S. multinationals avoid current U.S. taxation of their foreign business income by accumu-
lating such income in controlled foreign subsidiaries: in essence, their offshore piggybanks. The
ability to suspend the taxation of foreign business income in this manner is commonly referred to
as 'deferral,' and it has become an important strategic objective for managers of U.S.-based
multinationals.
10. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 965 (2010).
11. See generally Boise, supra note 9.
12. See I.R.C. § I1 (b)(1)(D) ("The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be the sum of ... 35
percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $10,000,000."); see also id. §§ 951, 952, 954.
13. Drucker, supra note 5.
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income-shifting method known to tax lawyers as the "Double Irish" and the "Dutch Sand-
wich," which, as some commentators noted, "[t]he sandwich leaves no tax behind to
taste."l 4 Despite the criticisms, several other U.S. technology-based companies, such as
Microsoft, Inc. and the social networking giant Facebook, have begun to utilize similar
methods to avoid tax payments to the U.S. government.1 5
Access to these strategies is widely available. For example, KPMG, one of the top four
U.S. accounting firms, conducted a survey in 2010 on corporate and indirect rates of
countries from various places around the world, which brought to light the incentives
behind why companies elect to establish related businesses on international soil, rather
than maintain full operations within U.S. borders.' 6 This survey is one of many informal
sources available to corporate directors, who will review information provided by KPMG
and other similar resources to make business decisions in the best interest of the share-
holders.17 As a result, if lawmakers continue to ignore this issue, we will see more compa-
nies creating offshore subsidiaries to reallocate profits and escape paying domestic taxes.
Part I of this paper compares international corporate taxation rates to U.S. rates to
provide a comprehensive understanding of why companies like Google would elect to
utilize transfer pricing and shift profits from U.S. soil. Part II explains the "Double Irish"
and "Dutch Sandwich" tax maneuvers and how Google implements these strategies to
legally lower their effective corporate tax rates to minimal levels. Part III examines vari-
ous legal measures that the U.S. government has enacted to counter-balance such prac-
tices and bring profits back within U.S. borders. It also examines the possible solutions to
the problem with commentary on why amendments to the current taxation regime are
necessary.
While the extent to which the global economy is affected by avoidance maneuvers im-
plemented by Google and other similarly situated companies remains unclear, such ma-
neuvers may eventually become commonplace practices for average-size businesses.
Moreover, while some commentators claim that Google is ignoring its corporate slogan,
"Don't be evil," by the creation of such a schemei these tax maneuvers may signify a
more disturbing and potentially detrimental future for international bodies choosing to
ignore such on-goings while the rest of the world embraces the ever-changing landscape
and globalization of international business transactions.
14. Id.
15. Id. ("'Google's practices are very similar to those at countless other global companies operating across a
wide range of industries."').




18. See, e.g., Drucker, supra note 5 ("Google is 'flying a banner of doing no evil, and then they're perpetrat-
ing evil under our noses."').
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II. Background
A. HISTORY AND HISTORICAL DATA ON CoRPoRATE TAx RATES IN THE UNITED
STATES
Corporate law in the United States pre-dates the imposition of the federal income tax.
Chief Justice John Marshall famously pronounced a corporation's essence in American
jurisprudence in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contem-
plation of law. Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to
its very existence. These are such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object
for which it was created. Among the most important are immortality, and, if the
expression may be allowed, individuality; properties, by which a perpetual succession
of many persons are considered as the same, and may act as a single individual. They
enable a corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold property, without the
perplexing intricacies, the hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual conveyances
for the purpose of transmitting it from hand to hand. It is chiefly for the purpose of
clothing bodies of men, in succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corpo-
rations were invented, and are in use.19
The idea that a corporation is separate from the individual has since continued themati-
cally with the enactment of subsequent laws regarding liability of corporations. 20 Follow-
ing the advent of the federal income tax in 1861, only individuals were taxed on a
percentage of their incomes. 21 It was not until the Revenue Act of 1894 that the U.S.
government established the principle of treating corporations as taxable entities separate
from their owners. 22 The Act was later overturned in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust
Co., 23 where the Supreme Court held 5-4 that the income taxes on interest, dividends, and
rents imposed by the Act were unconstitutional because they violated the constitutional
provision that direct taxes be apportioned. 24 In 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment reversed
the decision in Pollock by granting Congress the express power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes for individuals and corporations. 25
19. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
20. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899 (2010) (holding that government may
not, under the First Amendment, suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's corporate identity).
21. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Chronology of Events 1800-1899, http://www.treasury.gov/about/history/
Pages/1800-1899.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) ("August 5, 1861-The U.S. government levied the first
income tax to help pay for the Civil War. All incomes over $800 were taxed three percent until the year 1872,
when the tax was repealed.").
22. Jack Taylor, Corporation Income Tax Brackets and Rates, 1909-2002, IRS.Gov, at 284, http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/02corate.pdf.
23. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 429 (1895).
24. Id. at 586.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI ("The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration.").
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The first federal corporate income tax brackets were set at rate of 1% for all income
exceeding $5,000.26 From 1913-1915, Congress eliminated the tax brackets and instead
imposed the 1% rate on all taxable income.27 Corporate tax rates steadily increased for
the next few years until the advent of World War II, when economic conditions forced
Congress to dramatically increase the rates on the upper corporate income earners to pay
for war debts. 28 In 1939, corporations making over $25,000 per taxable year were sub-
jected to a tax rate of 19%.29 This rate increased to 24% in 1940 and rose as high as 40%
during war times.30 Corporate tax rates thereafter rose as high as 52.8% in 1969 before
finally settling on the present day rate of 35% for the highest corporate earners.31
With U.S. corporate tax revenues totaling $191.4 billion, or 9% of total tax revenues for
2010,32 it is no surprise that corporations are hiring tax attorneys to find ways to circum-
vent payments to the U.S. government and satisfy their shareholders. Some congressmen
are currently attempting to curb this behavior as they work to close these loopholes amid
the looming threat of ever-increasing debts.33 The eventual outcome of these tensions
remains unclear; but what remains certain is that corporations will continue to use all
means necessary, including outsourcing business overseas, to lower their effective tax de-
spite legislative attempts to the contrary.
B. SURVEY OF WORLD CORPORATE TAx RATES
With the second-highest gross domestic product (GDP) in the world in 2009, behind
the European Union,34 the United States imposes one of the highest marginal tax rates
(35%) in the world on its top corporate income earners.35 When this rate is coupled with
the power of states and local governments to impose additional corporate taxes ranging
from 1% to 12% (7.5% on average), U.S. corporations pay well above the world average
of 24.99% of their annual income to the federal government. 36 As a result, companies like




30. Id. at 287-88.
31. Id. at 288; see also I.R.C. § 11(b) (2011).
32. Jeanne Sahadi, Corporate Tax Reform: Talk Grows Louder, CNNMoNFY, Jan. 15, 2011, http://
money.cnn.com/2011/01/14/news/economy/corporate-tax-reform/index.htm?hpt=T2.
33. See, e.g., id. ("Many business leaders and tax experts say the corporate tax code discourages foreign
investment in the United States and hinders the ability of U.S. companies to compete internationally."); see
also Drucker, supra note 5 ("U.S. policy makers, meanwhile, have taken halting steps to address concerns
about transfer pricing. In 2009, the Treasury Department proposed levying taxes on certain payments be-
tween U.S. companies' foreign subsidiaries.").
34. See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html?countryName=United% 20States
&countryCode=us&regionCode=na&rank=2#us (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
35. I.R.C. § 11 (2011); see also Sahadi, supra note 32 ("The 35% top corporate tax rate . .. is among the
highest in the world.").
36. See Drucker, supra note 5 ("Two thousand U.S. companies paid a median effective cash rate of 28.3
percent in federal, state and foreign income taxes in a 2005 study by academics at the University of Michigan
and the University of North Carolina.").
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Google have chosen to establish subsidiaries in other countries with significantly more
favorable corporate tax rates to increase profits and offset any of the costs in the process.37
Japan, which in 2010 imposed the world's highest corporate tax rate of 40.69%, has
recently experienced the effects of that decision. 38 Because of recent economic woes and
corporations moving business outside of Japan's borders, Japanese lawmakers chose to cut
the corporate tax rate by around 5% to bring the rate more in line with that of the United
States. 39 With a national debt nearly twice the size of its $5 trillion economy, Prime
Minister Naoto Kan explained that "[b]y daring to go with a 5[%] reduction, [Japan] will
spur companies to invest domestically, expand employment and raise wages . . . [t]hat will
stimulate the domestic economy, support growth and shake off deflation."40 In the three
months following the announcement, the Japanese economy grew by a reported 1.1% .41
Although this is just a preliminary indication of signs that the Japanese economy is im-
proving, several commentators from some of Japan's largest corporations have noted that
having such a high corporate tax rate "has been one big barrier" to investment in Japanese
corporations, and therefore a reduction in the corporate tax rate was "imperative to attract
people, products and funds to Japan."4 2
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), a political unit comprised of the seven countries Abu
Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al Quwain, Fujairah, and Ras Al Khaimah, boasts
the highest tax rate on a specific corporate sector within their boundaries, namely oil
companies, which must pay 55% of their operating profits to the local government.43 But
citizens in the UAE are not subject to an individual income tax, nor do any other corpo-
rate sectors pay a corporate income tax, which likely offsets any detrimental effects to their
economy."4
Other notable countries with relatively high corporate tax rates include France at
33.33%, India at 33.99%, Libya at 40%, Pakistan at 35%, South Africa at 34.55%, and
Venezuela at 34%.45 While it may come as no surprise that these are also some of the
largest economies in the world, companies from these countries have already or soon will
likely implement tax avoidance maneuvers similar to that of Google or simply leave the
country for one with a lower corporate tax rate. This could result in dire consequences for
the long-term growth of these nations.
At the other end of the corporate tax spectrum, several countries, particularly those with
smaller, or less developed, economies refrain from imposing taxes on corporations within
their national borders. Several of these countries, such as the Bahamas, Bermuda, and the
Cayman Islands are located just off the coast of the United States and provide tax incen-
37. See, e.g., id.
38. See KPMG, supra note 16, at 13.
39. Hiroko Tabuchi, Japan Will Cut Corporate Income Tax Rate, N.Y. Tisis, Dec. 14, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/business/global/14yen.html ("Lowering the corporate tax burden by 5 per-
centage points could increase Japan's gross domestic product by 2.6 percentage points, or 14.4 trillion yen




43. The Federation of International Trade Associations, United Arab Emirates, http://www.fita.org/coun-
tries/uae.html?marubrique=fiscalite (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
44. See id.
45. KPMG, supra note 16, at 12-14.
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tives for U.S. companies that place subsidiaries at these locales.46 Bermuda in particular
has become a favorite offshore tax haven because it imposes no income tax, no capital
gains tax, no withholding tax on dividends or interest, and currently has no double taxa-
tion treaties with other countries.47 Other countries, like Bahrain, Guernsey, the Isle of
Man, Jersey, and Montenegro, also have either negligible or non-existent corporate tax
rates that attract investment from other countries around the world.48 The reasons a
country elects to have a certain corporate tax rate may differ from country to country
because there are so many economic variables that go into a country's decisions to levy a
corporate tax. But with the increased globalization of the world's economy and the pres-
sures on corporate directors to maintain high profit margins, there is now a tremendous
incentive for companies to send resources to foreign countries with lower tax rates at the
expense and to the detriment of their respective home countries, especially when the lo-
gistical barriers that may once have prevented them from investing abroad are gone.49
C. DiREcT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS AN INDICATOR AND THE CASE FOR IRELAND
One indicator that corporations are taking advantage of global tax rate differences is
direct foreign investment (DFI) into a country.o DFI is the "value of all investments . . .
in the home country made directly by residents-primarily companies-of other coun-
tries" during a given time period.si While DFI does not capture all of the economic
benefits effectuated by a low corporate tax rate, it does help to explain why certain coun-
tries attract more foreign investment than others despite the lack of domestic resources to
support such an investment. 52
The Netherlands and Ireland, both of which are utilized by Google to make their tax
avoidance scheme possible, are good examples.53 They rank seventh and nineteenth, re-
spectively, in the world for DF1s4 but have relatively low world rankings in population
(Netherlands-60th; Ireland-1 19th),ss members of the labor force (Netherlands-58th;
Ireland-1 19th),56 and GDP growth rate (Netherlands-157th; Ireland-199th).57 These
46. See id. at 12.
47. See Gov't of Berm., Office of the Tax Comm'r, About Us, http://www.taxbermuda.gov.bm/ (last visited
July 10, 2011); see also ADAM STARCIHILD, TAX HAVENS FOR CORPORATIONs 31-32 (1979).
48. See KPMG, supra note 16, at 12-13.
49. See Drucker, supra note 5.
50. See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: Stock of Direct Foreign Investment-At Home,




53. See Drucker, supra note 5.
54. See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: Stock of Direct Foreign Investment-At Home,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2198rank.html (last visited Feb. 22,
2011).
55. See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: Population, https://www.cia.gov/library/publica-
tions/the-world-factbook/rankorder/219rank.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
56. See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: Labor Force, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi-
cations/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2095rank.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
57. See The CIA World Factbook, Country Comparison: GDP-Real Growth Rate, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2003 rank.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
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rankings suggest that something other than an invaluable work force, such as more
favorable tax situations, contributes to the high influx of foreign investment.
Two attorneys who agree with this hypothesis, Joseph B. Darby M and Kelsey
Lemaster, found that Ireland has created an ideal situation for foreign investment, particu-
larly for foreign technology companies like Google.5 8 According to Darby and Lemaster,
Ireland's ability to attract foreign investment stems from pressure from the European
Union to remove discriminatory tax incentives and Ireland's subsequent decision to enact
a uniform corporate tax in 1999.59 As a result, Ireland imposes a meager 12.5% rate on
taxable income of corporations, which is one of the lowest corporate tax rates in the world,
especially among developed countries.60 Ireland has also entered into several favorable tax
treaties with other countries that have the effect of significantly limiting corporate income
taxes on business transactions made between those countries. 61 When coupled with Ire-
land's well-educated, English-speaking workforce "it is easy to see why Ireland has be-
come a preferred foreign base of operations for U.S. software companies and other U.S.
technology-driven enterprises." 6 2
Ireland simultaneously refuses to enforce aggressively "anti-abuse" mechanisms related
to transfer-pricing regulations. 6 3 Normally, countries with a high volume of economic
activity will heavily regulate transfer-pricing transactions to prevent maneuvers, like the
one employed by Google, where companies will shift taxable income to low-tax jurisdic-
tions. 64 For example, the United States has adopted Section 482 of the Internal Revenue
Code:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not incor-
porated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not affiliated)
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Secretary may
distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances be-
tween or among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that such
distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of
taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such organizations, trades, or
businesses.6s
This provision grants broad authority to the Treasury Secretary to "adjust" items that
are reported by corporations seeking to game, or even abuse, the transfer-pricing regula-
tions. 66 Without the ever-present threat that a corporation's income could be adjusted to
reflect properly any abuses of income tax laws and regulations, Ireland attracts more inter-
58. Joseph B. Darby III & Kelsey Lemaster, Double Irish More than Doubles Tax Savings: Hybrid Structure
Reduces Irish, U.S. and Worldwide Taxation, PRAc. U.S./Iwr'L TAx STRATEGIES, May 15, 2007, at 2, 11-16,
available at http://gtlaw.com/portalresource/lookup/wosid/contentpilot-core-2301-5813/pdfCopy.name=/
darby07g.pdf ("Ireland is attractive for low corporate tax rates and because it has yet to implement (or enforce







65. I.R.C. § 482 (2011).
66. See id.
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national business at the expense of decreased tax revenues. 67 While the long-term effects
of this decision still remain largely unclear, Ireland's recent seeking of bailout funds may,
in part, be attributable to such shortsighted fiscal policies. 68
D. BAsic INTERNATIONAL TAxATiON CONCEPTS OF CORPORATIONS
The United States subscribes to a "residence-based" tax system whereby a corporation
is subject to income tax if it is "created or organized in the United States or under the law
of the United States or of any State," or "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade
or business within the United States." 69 As such, U.S. corporations must pay federal in-
come taxes on all sources of income whether earned domestically or worldwide. 70 This is
true whether or not the taxes were paid in the foreign country based on the same receipt
of income.7' Accordingly, U.S.-based corporations must recognize taxable income attrib-
uted to their foreign subsidiaries' business operations worldwide. 72 Company directors,
therefore, often seek ways to alleviate the pressures of the "double taxation" by imple-
menting strategic tax avoidance measures to satisfy corporate shareholders' interests.
One way that corporations avoid this double taxation, which has enjoyed longtime sup-
port since early Tax Court decisions, is "by transferring assets and/or business activities to
a foreign corporation, such that neither the corporation nor the U.S. shareholder would
be currently taxable in the U.S. on the corporation's income."73 Corporations can set up
and transfer assets to foreign subsidiaries, which are recognized as separate taxable entities
67. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 12.
68. See Joe Brennan & Stephanie Bodoni, Ireland Seeks Bailout as 'Outsized' Problem Overwhelms Nation,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-21/lenihan-says-he-will-recom-
mend-ireland-should-fornally-ask-for-eu-bailout.htmI ("Ireland was one of the poorest countries in Europe
when it joined the EU in 1973 along with Britain. Even with European subsidies, unemployment in the mid-
1980s averaged 16 percent. In the 1990s, lured by a 12.5 percent corporate tax, companies such as Pfizer Inc.
and Microsoft Corp. helped Ireland export its way into becoming the "Celtic Tiger." The jobless rate sank to
3.9 percent by 2001. In the decade through 2006, Ireland grew at an average annual rate of about 7 percent,
the fastest among euro-area countries. That expansion, together with easy credit, fanned a real- estate bub-
ble. Home prices almost quadrupled in the decade through 2007. It went disastrously wrong for Ireland
following the 2008 demise of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which turned the slowdown in the property
market into an implosion that engulfed the economy. The ISEQ stock index has plunged 70 percent from its
record in 2007.").
69. Matthew J. Mauntel, Stimulating the Stimulus: U.S. Controlled Subsidiaries and I.R.C. § 965, 33 B.C.
INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 107, 109 (2010) (citing I.R.C. § 11 (2011)) ("stating that all corporations are taxed on
their income, but that is further limited to domestic corporations by I.R.C. § 882").
70. Treas. Reg. § 1.1-1(b) (1974) ("[AIII citizens . . . are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code
whether the income is received from sources within or without the United States.").
71. The Tax Code recognizes the existence of two types of corporations-domestic (one organized or cre-
ated under the laws of the United States, or any of its states) and foreign (one which is not domestic). I.R.C.
§ 7701(a)(4)-(5) (2011). "The term 'domestic' when applied to a corporation or partnership means created or
organized in the United States or under the law of the United States or of any State unless, in the case of a
partnership, the Secretary provides otherwise by regulations." Id. § 7701(a)(4). "The term 'foreign' when
applied to a corporation or partnership means a corporation or partnership which is not domestic." Id.
§ 7701(a)(5).
72. See id. § 11(a) ("A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of every corpora-
tion."); id. § 882(a)(1) (defining as "taxable income" that income which is "effectively connected with the
conduct of a trade or business within the United States.")
73. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 2.
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and whose income does not automatically flow through the parent corporation. 74 In the
event that the foreign subsidiary earns income from sources outside the United States and
conjunctively does not conduct a U.S. trade or business, the foreign subsidiary is not sub-
jected to taxation by the United States.75 But any distributions by a subsidiary in the form
of dividend payments76 or payments for goods or services that are repatriated back into
U.S. soil are taxable upon receipt by the corporation's shareholders.77
Due to the stringent nature of Tax Court decisions, corporate tax advisors must strategi-
cally plan around these provisions and study world corporate tax rates to incorporate fed-
eral tax avoidance measures like the "Double Irish" and "Dutch Sandwich." As shown,
anyone who studies the Tax Code and applicable case law quickly realizes the ever-present
struggle between both individuals and corporations and the IRS for payment and non-
payment of taxes, which serves as a viable starting point for this paper's analysis of
Google's tax avoidance mechanisms.
E. FOREIGN TAx HAVENS
Since the rise of the corporate fiduciary duty by directors to protect shareholder inter-
ests, corporations have sought ways to increase earnings and decrease operational costs-
one such operational cost being taxes. Unfortunately for those companies incorporated
within U.S. borders, complete avoidance of taxation is tricky because income tax calcula-
tions are based on U.S. citizenship.78 Consequently, the U.S. corporation cannot com-
pletely avoid federal taxation without simultaneously relinquishing its U.S. citizenship.79
Companies not willing to take such extreme action will instead take advantage of the
Nineteenth Century principle that corporations, under the U.S. Constitution, enjoy sepa-
rate legal status from their employees.80 When applied, the separate "legal person" prin-
ciple entitles a foreign-based corporation "to the same privileges, as any citizen of that
country."8 Such privileges entitle the corporation to benefit from the tax laws governing
that particular country, aside from any multi-national tax treaties senior to those laws. 82
Similar behaviors are observed in companies located solely within U.S. borders-for ex-
ample, many companies elect to incorporate in the state of Delaware due to more
74. See PHILLIP F. POSTLEWAITE, INTFRNATIONAL CORPORAi' TAXATION 5 (1980).
75. See id. at 5-6.
76. I.R.C. § 316(a) (2011) (the term "dividend" is defined as "any distribution made by a corporation to its
shareholders-1) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913, or 2) out of its earnings
and profits of the taxable year . . . without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the
distribution was made.").
77. See POSTLEVAITE, supra note 74, at 6.
78. Id. at 11.
79. See id. ("For most American businessmen, relinquishing U.S. citizenship is neither necessary nor desira-
ble. The most commonly used method of establishing the tax haven company, therefore, is to incorporate in
the tax haven country (or countries, if a tiered structure is desirable), thereby taking advantage of the principle
that is observed world-wide-a corporation has the legal status of a separate legal person.").
80. Santa Clara v. S. Pat. R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886) ("One of the points made and discussed at length in
the brief of counsel for defendants in error was that 'Corporations are persons within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."') (comments of court reporter in preamble
to opinion).
81. See POSTLEV'AITF, supra note 74, at 11.
82. See id. at 11-12.
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favorable liability protections.8 3 While incorporating in another state does not give the
corporation more favorable federal income tax treatment, the basic principle remains the
same: businesses will constantly seek avenues to lower costs and avoid risk exposure in the
form of liabilities, taxes, or any other cost-inducing mechanism.84
The foreign tax haven can be recognized in basically any form of business genre found
in the United States. Companies in one of the most popular industries-shipping (or
aircraft) services-regularly establish tax haven companies by incorporating in low-tax ju-
risdictions. Due to the transient nature of their business and near-universal demand, ship-
ping corporations, like DHL (originally founded in San Francisco, CA in 1969 and
reincorporated in Germany in 2001), have either been bought out or established their
headquarters overseas because of lower corporate tax rates.8 5
Google, a producer of mainly intangible computer and internet software, utilizes enti-
ties formally known as "patent holding companies" to create tax havens. Although prima-
rily based out of California, Google creates licensing agreements with its international
subsidiaries by allowing them to realize profits from the use of Google's software outside
U.S. borders. 86 Because the local laws in which the subsidiary is located (in this case, the
Netherlands) allows the subsidiary to deduct royalty payments from gross income calcula-
tions on distributions made to Google in accordance with the licensing agreement, the
Dutch subsidiary avoids Dutch withholding taxes on dividends.87 Therefore, Google and
its Dutch subsidiary set the royalty rate at an optimum level to minimize Dutch tax expo-
sure and maintain operations abroad.8 8 Although Google's system is significantly more
complicated, as the next section explains the underlying theme remains the same: Google
(a publicly traded company since August 200489) ultimately answers to its shareholders,
whose stock appreciates in value when Google is able to report high profit margins.
F. APPLICABLE PROVISIONS TO MAKE THESE SCHEMEs POSSIBLE
As corporate tax strategists continue to discover more complex ways to circumvent rec-
ognition of taxable income, Congress has attempted to counteract the transfer of assets by
enacting "anti-deferral rules" and transfer-pricing rules to prevent or penalize the use of a
foreign corporation to avoid taxes on sources of income.90 Anti-deferral rules seek to curb
a domestic corporation's ability to defer recognition of income attributed to a foreign
subsidiary.9 ' One such anti-deferral rule is codified in Section 951 of the Tax Code, which
83. See id.
84. See id. at 12.
85. DHL, Company Portrait, http://www.dhl.com/en/about-us/company-portrait.html (last visited June
27, 2011).
86. See generally Erik Sherman, How Google Hides its Profitsfrom the Tax Man, BNET, Oct. 21, 2010, http://
www.bnet.com/blog/technology-business/how-google-hides-its-profits-from-the-tax-man/6296; see also
Google, About Us, http://www.google.com/intl/en/contact/ (last visited June 27, 2011).
87. See POSTLEWAITE, supra note 74, at 26-27.
88. See id.
89. Paul R. La Monica, Google Sets $2.7 Billion IPO, CNNMONEY, Apr. 30, 2004, http://money.cnn.com/
2004/04/29/technology/google/ ("In the filing, Google said that it generated revenues of $961.9 million in
2003 and reported a net profit of $106.5 million. Sales rose 177 percent from a year ago although earnings
increased by just 6 percent. Google also revealed that [it] has been profitable since 2001.").
90. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 10.
91. See id. at 11.
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requires U.S. shareholders to currently recognize parts of their income from "controlled
foreign corporations" (CFC's).92
The Internal Revenue Code provides for the taxation of CFC's, which are controlled by
U.S.-based parent companies.93 A CFC is defined as:
Any foreign corporation if more than fifty percent of (1) the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock of such corporation entitled to vote, or (2) the total value
of the stock of such corporation, is owned (within the meaning of section 958(a)), or
is considered as owned by applying the rules of ownership of section 958(b), by
United States shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such foreign
corporation. 94
Consequently, a U.S. shareholder must have ownership of the CFC's company stock to
satisfy the "control" requirement for purposes of taxation. 95 The U.S. shareholder is then
taxed at the applicable tax rate based on the receipt of income from the CFC.96
Because U.S. parent corporations generally qualify as "U.S. shareholders," 97 if the par-
ent corporation's ownership of the subsidiary's stock rises to the level of 50% or more,
then their parent/subsidiary relationship meets the definition of a CFC and all income will
be currently recognizable during the taxable year.98 While this rule as codified can be
used to give corporations generous tax breaks, Tax Court decisions have limited the availa-
bility of these breaks by strictly enforcing the requirements of section 957(a). For exam-
ple, the Tax Court in Framatome Connectors USA, Inc. v. C.I.R.99 held that a U.S.
corporation failed the "control" requirement of section 957(a) where it did not own 50%
or more of the "voting power" in stocks of the foreign subsidiary. 00 The Tax Court found
it dispositive that the six veto powers and an 80% supermajority permitted the Japanese-
based subsidiary to block important company decisions, and, as a result, the U.S. parent
company did not exercise "control" over the requisite voting power for section 957(a)
recognition.' 0
Shareholders of CFC's are taxed according to the rules for "Subpart F" income.102
Subpart F income includes: 1) income from the insurance of U.S. risks; 2) foreign base
92. I.R.C. § 951(a)(1) (2011) ("(1) IN GENERAL. If a foreign corporation is a controlled foreign corporation
for an uninterrupted period of 30 days or more during any taxable year, every person who is a United States
shareholder (as defined in subsection (b)) of such corporation and who owns (within the meaning of section
958(a)) stock in such corporation on the last day, in such year, on which such corporation is a controlled
foreign corporation shall include in his gross income, for his taxable year in which or with which such taxable
year of the corporation ends, (A) the sum of (5) his pro rata share (determined under paragraph (2)) of the
corporation's subpart F income for such year.").
93. See generally id. §§ 951-964.
94. Id. § 957(a).
95. See id.
96. See id. § 95 1(a).
97. See id. § 951(b) ("[The term "United States shareholder" means, with respect to any foreign corpora-
tion, a United States person ... who owns ... 10 percent or more of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote of such foreign corporation.").
98. See id. § 957(a).
99. Framatome Connectors USA, Inc. v. C.I.R., 118 T.C. 32, 32 (2002).
100. Id. at 60-61.
101. See id. at 49.
102. See I.R.C. § 952(a)(1)-( 4) (2011).
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company income; and 3) amounts attributable to international boycott participation or to
illegal bribes or kickbacks. 03 Most relevant to this article, "foreign base company in-
come" includes: 1) foreign personal holding company income; 2) foreign base company
sales income; 3) foreign base company services income; and 4) foreign base company oil
related income. 04 To prevent corporations from abusing the recognition provisions of
section 957(a), Congress, under section 952(a)(2), requires CFC's to report "foreign based
income," defined by section 954(a) to mean, in part, "the foreign base company sales in-
come for the taxable year." 05 Accordingly, if a CFC receives income earned abroad, it
must report it to the parent company located in the United States, who subsequently must
recognize the earnings as taxable income under the Tax Code. 0 6 For many software-
based companies who sell and license software products to foreign-based CFCs, this
catch-all income recognition provision generally prevents tax avoidance on the sale of
software products to CFCs, because even though they are outside U.S. borders, when the
CFCs turn around to sell the products, the U.S. corporation will have to recognize the
income from these transactions. 0 7
These rules fall short of capturing Google's strategy, which utilizes a transfer-pricing
model that avoids section 954 recognition through an exception to the Tax Code on trans-
fers of intangible property. As a service-based internet company that provides advertising
and search engine products, Google takes advantage of the exemptions provided by the
Tax Code for "foreign base company sales income" from its advertising programs. 0
Generally, when a U.S. corporation transfers a product to one of its foreign-based subsidi-
aries, section 367(d)(2)(A)(i) necessarily deems the property to be sold "in exchange for
payments which are contingent upon the productivity, use, or disposition of such prop-
erty."1 09 Sections 954(a)(2 ) and 954(b)(5) generally mandate distributions to domestic
shareholders made by CFCs to be taxable events if the following four requirements are
met:
1) the purchase or sale must be to or from a related party;
2) the transaction must involve personal property;
3) the purchase or sale must be for use or destination outside the base company juris-
diction; and
4) the personal property must not have been manufactured, produced or constructed by
the foreign base company."10
The term "related parties" is defined to include all entities and individuals that own
more than 50% of the CFC's stock."'
103. See id.
104. Id. § 954(a).
105. Id. § 954(a)(2).
106. Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 2, 11.
107. See id. at 11.
108. I.R.C. § 954(d)(1).
109. I.R.C. § 367(d)(2)(A)(i).
110. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 74, at 249-50; see also I.R.C. § 9 54(a)(2), (b)(5), (d)(1)(A-B).
111. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 74, at 250; see also I.R.C. § 954(d)(3). The term "related parties" also in-
cludes corporations controlled by the CFC or by the same persons who control the CFC. PosTLEWArE,
supra note 74, at 250.
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Conversely, and as is the case with Google, the foreign base provision is inapplicable if
the personal property is "manufactured, produced, or constructed by the CFC."112 The
Treasury Regulations provide that this exemption is only applicable if the CFC manufac-
tures the property in its totality or conducts a "substantial transformation of the prop-
erty."' 3 The Tax Court historically takes a relaxed approach when addressing the issue of
"substantial transformation," making the determination on a case-by-case analysis by
looking at the totality of the surrounding facts and circumstances.1 4 On the other hand,
if the property purchased by the CFC is not "substantially transformed," but instead is
utilized as a component part in the end-product (i.e. computer hard drives purchased for
the manufacture of assembled computers), then the income generated from the sale be-
comes taxable income under the Code.115 The court in Dave Fischbein sided with a U.S.
corporate taxpayer in its holding because the operations of its subsidiary established in
Belgium were "substantial [enough] in nature ... to constitute the manufacture of [the]
product."'I6 Even though the U.S.-based corporate stock holder was fully capable of de-
veloping the end product, the court found it dispositive that the lower labor and overhead
costs, tariff and quantity restrictions, and the subsidiary's purchase of some of the ma-
chine's components from unrelated local entities were sufficient to warrant the exclusion
of the income generated from the reach of U.S. taxation." 7
Ordinarily, software companies that develop their product solely within U.S. borders
subsequently must recognize the income attributed to these transfers as taxable income
because of their "sale" recognition." 8 But section 367(d) recognition does not apply to
cross-border transfers of intangible property if the intangible property is developed by the
CFC outside of the United States."' 9 Moreover, if the software is a product of joint devel-
opment through a "cost-sharing" arrangement, whereby the rights to utilize the intangible
property in the United States are retained by the U.S. company (i.e. Google), and the
rights to utilize the property outside the United States are vested in the CFC, then the
non-U.S. rights are treated as being created in the jurisdictional location of the CFC.120
It is under these circumstances that software companies, like Google, can avoid section
112. POSTLEWAITE, snpra note 74, at 250.
113. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4)(ii) (2009) and examples thereunder.
114. See Dave Fischbein Mfg. Co. v. Comm'r., 59 T.C. 338, 352, 360 (1972) (income from individual parts
of portable bag-closing machines was not includable as Subpart F income because the parts "were not perfect,
that many of them had to be individually tailored and tested in order to have a completed, functioning sewing
machine, that the mechanics were trained and experienced and used skill and judgment in performing their
tasks, and that they were not performing purely ministerial functions.").
115. See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-3(a)(4)(ii) ("If personal property purchased by a foreign corporation is substan-
tially transformed by such foreign corporation prior to sale, the property sold by the selling corporation is
manufactured, produced, or constructed by such selling corporation.").
116. Dave Fiscbbein, 59 T.C. at 357.
117. See id.
118. I.R.C. § 367(d)(2)(A) (2011) ("[T]he United States person transferring such property shall be treated
as- (i) having sold such property in exchange for payments which are contingent upon the productivity, use,
or disposition of such property, and (u) receiving amounts which reasonably reflect the amounts which would
have been received-(I) annually in the form of such payments over the useful life of such property, or (II) in
the case of a disposition following such transfer (whether direct or indirect), at the time of the disposition.
The amounts taken into account under clause (ii) shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the
intangible.").
119. I.R.C. § 367(d)(1) (2011).
120. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 11; see generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A (2009).
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945 and section 367 recognition through the cost-sharing arrangement of transfer-
pricing.
II. Discussion
A. THE ISSUE OF TRANSFER PRICING
Due to the rise in communications and increased economic globalization, the world has
witnessed a relatively new phenomenon-the "Multinational Enterprise" (MNE).121 Be-
cause MNEs do not have to adhere to one single, internationally recognized tax code, the
use of MlNEs creates increasingly complex taxation issues for tax administrations around
the world.122 Consequently, various tax administrations use transfer-pricing guidelines as
a means to govern MNE activity as they, like most consumers, search for ways to re-
capture those profits otherwise lost to taxation.
Transfer-pricing is the practice of making payments from one business entity to another
affiliated business entity for the receipt of goods or services.12 3 MiNEs may elect to utilize
transfer-pricing for marketing or policy reasons, or to avoid the higher taxation rates im-
posed upon market-based transactions, as in Google's case. 124 Because commercial trans-
actions between two related business entities are not subject to the same market forces as
those pertaining to non-related entities, members of the Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD) have agreed to abide by a principle known as the
"Arms-Length Principle" to ensure that the tax base of MNEs is divided fairly.125 Article
Nine of the OECD Model Tax Convention explains:
[When] conditions are made or imposed between . . . two [associated] enterprises in
their commercial or financial relations which differ from those which would be made
between independent enterprises, then any profits which would, but for those condi-
tions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have
not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and taxed
accordingly.126
Abiding by this principle treats transactions between related companies as though they
were non-related, "arms-length" dealings, thereby theoretically subjecting them to
equivalent tax treatment. 127 The OECD member countries believe that adoption of this
creates broad parity of tax treatment between MNEs and independent enterprises.128 Ac-
121. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations, at P-1, 9 1 (1995) ("The growth of MNEs presents increas-
ingly complex taxation issues for both tax administrations and the MNEs themselves since separate country
rules for the taxation of MNEs cannot be viewed in isolation but must be addressed in broad international
context.").
122. See id. at P-1, | 2.
123. OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, About Transfer Pricing, http://www.oecd.org/about/
0,3347,en_2649 33753_I_1 1 11,00.htrn1 (last visited June 26, 2011).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See OECD, supra note 121, at 1-3, 1 1.6.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 1.7.
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cordingly, the principle seeks to eliminate any tax advantages or disadvantages that would
create distortions of relative competitive advantages associated with related or non-related
status.129
As mentioned above, national tax laws like section 482 of the U.S. Tax Code allow tax
administrations to enforce the "Arm's Length Principle" by "apportion[ing] or allocat[ing]
gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations,
trades, or businesses, if [they] determine[ ] that such distribution, apportionment, or allo-
cation is necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any of such organizations, trades, or businesses."o3 0 Nevertheless, because the tax laws
and regulations have failed to adapt to the changing times, Google has found several tax
loopholes between various OECD member countries to allow it to reduce their effective
tax rate to a meager 2.4%.131
B. EXPLANATION OF THE "DOUBLE IRISH" AND "DUTCH SANDWICH"
Utilizing a complex scheme of transfer-pricing agreements, conflicting tax codes, and
bi-lateral tax agreements, Google has amazed many on-lookers that its system remains
legally viable. The company accomplishes this feat through the creation of two subsidiar-
ies in Ireland, one subsidiary in the Netherlands, and one subsidiary in Bermuda.132 In
2003, Google, a United States corporation, initiated the process when it negotiated and
received approval from the IRS for its confidential transfer pricing arrangement with a
newly established subsidiary, Google Ireland Holdings (Ire. sub. 1) (GIH).133 In accor-
dance with the principles of transfer-pricing mentioned above, Google, as a software de-
veloper, could set up the joint development transfer-pricing arrangement with its GIH
subsidiary so that Google retained the domestic rights for use of the software and GIH
obtained the international rights for use of their software through an amortized buy-in
agreement.' 34 As such, GIH controlled access to Google's famously popular search en-
gine software, advertising banners, and the Android platform.135
By allocating all of their international revenues to Ireland, Google could continue to
research and develop products in the United States while simultaneously earning profits
abroad and avoiding high U.S. corporate taxation rates. 36 GIH next established its oper-
ational "anchor" off the U.S. coast in the British overseas territory of Bermuda.137 This
Bermudian subsidiary claims to be the "effective centre of management" for GIH, thereby
exempting GIH from Irish taxation.i38 Furthermore, by filing a "check-the-box election,"
129. See id.
130. I.R.C. § 482 (2010).
131. See Drucker, supra note 5.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A(a) (2009) ("A cost sharing arrangement is an agreement under which the
parties agree to share the costs of development of one or more intangibles in proportion to their shares of
reasonably anticipated benefits from their individual exploitation of the interests in the intangibles assigned to
them under the arrangement.").
135. Sherman, supra note 86.
136. See Drucker, supra note 5.
137. See id.
138. See id.
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the Bermudian subsidiary, as a "foreign eligible entity," 39 can elect to be classified as an
entity that is disregarded as separate from its parent-company, Google, for U.S. tax pur-
poses.140 As a result, any exchange of "royalty" payments between GIH and its Bermudian
tax haven transfers tax-free from any tax administration because the U.S. or Irish taxation
laws do not recognize the Bermuda subsidiary as a taxable entity for purposes of their tax
codes.141
Returning to the Irish mainland, GIH, as a licensee of Google's software, allows one of
its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Google Ireland Limited (GIL) to utilize Geogle's software
to perform its global marketing operations and receive all international advertising prof-
its.142 This tax maneuver earns the nickname "Double Irish" for its employment of two
Irish-based subsidiaries for its international operations.1 43 In turn, GIL receives all for-
eign-based income' 44 that, subsequently, is subjected to the favorable 12.5% corporate tax
rate in Ireland as a beneficiary of the cost-sharing agreement.145 In 2009, GIL was
credited by Google with 88% of its $12.5 billion in non-U.S. sales.146
Conversely, Irish tax law allows GIL to write off its royalty payments for use of GIH's
software rights as trade expenses that, in 2008, permitted GIL to deduct $5.4 billion in
royalties, and left GIL paying at a nominal 1% effective tax rate.147 If GIL immediately
tried to return these profits back to GIH, the transfer would create taxable income under
Irish law.148 Instead, GIL and GIH set these royalty payments at an optimal level so that
GIL can reduce its taxable income to a nominal amount to be taxed at the Irish 12.5%
corporate rate. 49 Therefore, to evade Irish withholding taxes, payments from GIL must
take a brief detour in the Netherlands-a maneuver characterized as the "Dutch Sand-
wich"-before finding their way back to GIH.so
By exploiting a low rate of corporate taxation and generous European Union (EU)
agreements, GIL is able to make "royalty" payments to another EU member, the Nether-
lands.151 Per the "Taxation of Cross-Border Interest and Royalty Payments" agreement
by the EU member states in June 2003, corporations in one member state are allowed to
make interest and royalty payments to subsidiaries located in other member states, pro-
139. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) (2006) (A "foreign eligible entity" is any foreign entity that (i) engages
in a threshold quantum of business activity such that is not properly classified as a trust, and (ii) is not
explicitly listed in the regulations as a "per se" corporation.); see alsoTreas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a), 2(a), 2(b)(8)
(2006) (for listing of "per se" corporations).
140. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 12.
141. See Sherman, supra note 86.
142. See Drucker, supra note 5.
143. See id.
144. See I.R.C. § 95 4(a)(2) (2011) ("The term 'foreign base company income' means ... (2) the foreign base
company sales income for the taxable year.").
145. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7A (2011) ("A cost sharing arrangement is an agreement under which the par-
ties agree to share the costs of development of one or more intangibles in proportion to their shares of
reasonably anticipated benefits from their individual exploitation of the interests in the intangibles assigned to
them under the arrangement."); see also Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 12.
146. Drucker, supra note 5.
147. Sherman, supra note 86.
148. See id.
149. Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 14.
150. Drucker, supra note 5.
151. Id.
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vided that the beneficial owner of the payment is a company or permanent establishment
in another member state.152 GIL, therefore, pays royalties to an employee-less shell cor-
poration in the Netherlands, Google Netherlands Holdings BV (Dut. sub.) (GNH), with
the sole purpose of receiving these payments from GIL, and immediately redirecting them
to the Bermuda holding company. 53 All of the income received by the Bermudian sub-
sidiary, in turn, enjoys the luxury of sandy beaches and Bermuda's non-existent corporate
taxation rates.1 54 The reported income remains on the island until Google decides to
repatriate the income through dividend payments, whereby the payment will be subjected
to the applicable U.S. dividend rate of taxation. 55 Assuming Google has no plans to
repatriate these revenues back into the country any time soon, Google shareholders con-
tinue to benefit from skewed annual reportings, while the U.S. government, to date, re-
ports losses upwards of $60 billion.156
While policymakers search for ways to close these gaps that cost the U.S. Treasury
millions of dollars each year, Google has benefited greatly from employing this scheme.
In 2001, Google reported revenues of nearly $86.5 million, of which only 18% were at-
tributable to international revenues.' 57 By 2004, the year of Google's Initial Public Offer-
ing, revenues had nearly quadrupled from 2001 reportings to $3.2 billion, and
international revenues accounted for 34% of Google's revenues.1ss Six years later,
Google's financial statements have been off the charts as the effects of increased market
globalization and internet usage have made Google one of the highest revenue-grossing
corporations in the world. To date, Google reports 2010 unaudited gross revenues total-
ing more than $29.3 billion, of which 52% are attributable to international revenues.SO
Even though much of these revenues do not translate into taxable income to the U.S.
government, profits lost to foreign taxable entities cost taxpayers millions in lost revenue.
While the U.S. government tries to close a national debt in excess of $1.4 trillion, Google
and other U.S.-based companies implementing the "Double Irish" and "Dutch Sandwich"
tax avoidance arrangements have their proverbial cake and eat it too by reaping the bene-
fits of the U.S. economy and more favorable tax laws abroad.160
152. European Commission Taxation and Customs Union, Taxation of Cross-Border Interest and Royalty
Payments in the European Union, http://ec.europa.eu/taxationCustoms/taxation/company-tax/inter-
ests.royalties/index en.htn (last visited June 26, 2011) ("These interest and royalty payments shall be exempt
from any taxes in that State provided that the beneficial owner of the payment is a company or permanent
establishment in another Member State.").
153. See Sherman, spra note 86.
154. See KPMG, spra note 16, at 12.
155. See Darby & Lemaster, supra note 58, at 13.
156. See Drucker, supra note 5.
157. Google, 2003 Financial Tables-Investor Relations, http://investor.google.com/financial/2003/tables.
html (last visited June 26, 2011).
158. Google, 2004 Financial Tables-Investor Relations, http://investor.google.com/financial/2004/tables.
html (last visited June 26, 2011).
159. Google, 2010 Financial Tables-Investor Relations, http://investor.google.com/financial/2010/tables.
html (last visited June 26, 2011).
160. See generally Drucker, supra note 5.
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IV. Possible Solutions to the Problem
A. APPLICATION OF I.R.C. SECTION 965
In 2005, the IRS reported nearly $804 billion in earnings and profits earned abroad by
controlled foreign companies of U.S. corporations.161 Conversely, only $362 billion of
those earnings were subsequently repatriated back into the U.S. economy and taxed at the
U.S. corporate income tax rate.162 That same year, Congress, as part of the American
Jobs Creation Act of 2004, enacted section 965 of the Tax Code in an attempt to offer
companies a one-time opportunity to repatriate profits earned abroad at greatly reduced
tax consequences to the company.163 The reasoning behind section 965's enactment was
the belief that the repatriation of profits would stimulate the economy and create jobs for
American workers in the process. 64 Instead, commentators observed the following:
Economists concluded that the repatriation holiday produced a windfall gain for
companies with large amounts of accumulated earnings in low-tax countries. They
found that companies used the funds principally for share repurchases. And they
found that companies that benefited from the holiday were no more likely to spend
on growing their businesses than companies that did not benefit.16s
While the U.S. economy never fully realized the potential benefits of section 965 as a
means to recapture those foreign profits avoiding high U.S. corporate tax rates, section
965 serves as a reminder that the process may not be an easy one, considering corpora-
tions willingness to dole out large sums of cash to protect their bottom line.166
In its current form, section 965 allows MNEs from the United States to benefit from an
85% tax break from income earned by foreign subsidiaries given that the payments were
repatriated through cash dividends to their U.S. parent company within a one year time
frame.167 Section 965(b)(4) requires the dividend payments to adhere to the Domestic
Reinvestment Plan ("DRIP") requirements, in that they: a) be approved by the taxpayer's
president, or chief executive officer (or equivalent) along with subsequent approval by the
taxpayer's board of directors (or its equivalent), and b) be provided for reinvestment in the
U.S. economy as a source of "worker hiring and training, infrastructure, research and
development, capital investments, or the financial stabilization of the corporation for the
purposes of job retention or creation." 68
161. Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Repatriation Aid for the Financial Crisis?, 53 TAx NOTES
INTr'L 275, 276 (2009).
162. Id.
163. Celina Rogers, Risk and Section 965 Repatriation, CFO.com, Oct. 20, 2005, http://www.cfo.con/arti-
cle.cfm/4486225/c 5541231/?f=archives.
164. I.R.C. § 965 (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 108-548(1) (2004) ("The Committee observes that the residual U.S.
tax imposed on the repatriation of foreign earnings can serve as a disincentive to repatriate these earnings.
The Committee believes that a temporary reduction in the U.S. tax on repatriated dividends will stimulate
the U.S. domestic economy by triggering the repatriation of foreign earnings that otherwise would have
remained abroad. The Committee emphasizes that this is a temporary economic stimulus measure.").
165. See Shephard & Sullivan, supra note 161, at 276-77.
166. Mauntel, sutpra note 69, at 128.
167. Id.
168. See I.R.C. § 965(b)(4) (2011).
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Not surprisingly, many corporations who took advantage of the tax holiday seemingly
ignored the federally-mandated requirements,169 as the U.S. Treasury reported only $16.5
billion in revenues from its enactment.170 Some companies even cut jobs domestically
after repatriating billions in cash dividends.171 Section 965 had a second side effect be-
cause it incentivized companies to ship intangible assets abroad in hopes that Congress
would either extend the applicable period or reintroduce the bill at a subsequent date.172
Despite lobbying efforts by companies like Oracle Corp., Eli Lilly & Co., and Hewlett-
Packard Co. to have Congress grant such relief, Congress has repeatedly declined to re-
enact section 965, likely due to the previous abuses and marginal returns of its
existence.173
One method to accomplish essentially the same goals as those provided by section 965
would be to completely eliminate the DRIP requirements before reenacting a Tax Holiday
program like the one provided by section 965. However, taking into account the potential
for abuse of another tax holiday and the fact that billions of dollars in corporate profits
remain stationed abroad until a time when it becomes profitable to repatriate them back
into the United States, it is still a question how the U.S. government, likely with the help
of other foreign governments, can close this gaping hole in the Tax Code while avoiding
the dire consequence of forcing U.S. corporations to move their headquarters abroad.
Moreover, how much does the U.S. government care that these sorts of tax havens con-
tinue to exist in the face of historically high federal deficits? Recent political history
would suggest not much.
B. IMPLEMENTING A NEw SYsTENI OF FOREIGN TAXATION
A simpler solution, considering its ranking among other developed nations, would be to
follow in the footsteps of Japanese lawmakers and lower the tax rate for all U.S. corpora-
tions to a level on par with, or lower than, other developed nations. Currently, the U.S.
marginal corporate tax rate ranks at the top of industrialized nations.174 Yet the current
state of affairs of its tax system advocates continual defectors and circumventors who aim-
lessly sink profits into tax avoidance schemes to gain a larger piece of the consumer-driven
economy of the United States. Alternatively, providing incentives in the form of tax
breaks or lower rates for U.S. corporations who, in fact, derive profits from CFCs could
recapture lost tax revenues while mitigating the unwarranted externality of shipping cor-
porate business abroad. U.S. resistance to such a system has seemingly backfired on the
Treasury and IRS, as they both waste millions of taxpayer dollars per year in oversight and
monitoring of the tax schemes, only to arrive at the all-too-obvious conclusion that U.S.
corporations are setting up these schemes and the government has no real way of stopping
it.175
169. See Shephard & Sullivan, supra note 161, at 278-79.
170. See Mauntel, supra note 69, at 113.
171. See id. at 120-21.
172. See id. at 126.
173. Ryan J. Donmoyer, Lilly, Oracle Lose Senate Bid for Overseas-Profits Tax Discount, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 4,
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anUvSkYMAtT8&refer=us.
174. See KPMG, supra note 16, at 12.
175. See Drucker, supra note 5.
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Notably, Matthew J. Mauntel offered similar advice in his article Stimulating the Stimu-
lus: U.S. Controlled Subsidiaries and I.R.C. 965, where he suggested that the United States
look to the recent overhauls in the Canadian approach to CFCs.176 Currently, Canadian
tax regulations provide tax exemptions for foreign-based income derived from certain
countries privy to tax-information-sharing agreements with the Canadian government.177
This system exempts almost 90% of foreign-based corporate income produced by Cana-
dian subsidiaries.178 Due to the similarities between the U.S. and Canadian tax systems
and the free trade agreement between the countries, 79 it would significantly benefit the
United States to follow in Canada's footsteps before it loses business in a similar fashion to
its neighbors to the north.
To date, the United States has tax treaties established with sixty-seven countries around
the world.' 80 This list includes countries relevant to the "Double Irish" and "Dutch Sand-
wich" maneuvers, like Ireland and the Netherlands.' 8' Similarly (and unlikely by coinci-
dence, given Google's contemporaneous undertakings), in 2003, the United States and the
Bahamas entered into an information-sharing agreement that took effect on January 1,
2004.182 These types of treaties and agreements are intended to increase the transparency
of international tax mechanisms and, in some cases, tax individuals and entities at reduced
rates on certain items of income they receive.s 3
Yet by allowing for an exemption for most, if not all, of foreign-earned corporate in-
come, whether from countries sharing treaties or information agreements or on the
whole, internationally-based corporations would likely find it economically advantageous
to repatriate profits stationed abroad or move businesses into the United States. Moreo-
ver, the United States may find the economic stimulus package it has so desperately
sought over the past decade, notwithstanding the repeated failures of raising and lowering
of the prime rate and ineffective domestic tax credits. As Mauntel is quick to point out,
"the United States and Canada are two of the last industrialized countries to attempt
world-wide taxation and Canada is prudently in the process of abandoning it after finding
it uncompetitive and unwieldy."' 84
For example, section 954(b)(3)(A) currently provides an exclusion of foreign-based in-
come if the sum of the foreign base company income constitutes less than 5% of the gross
income of the entire corporation."s5 The Code further requires that the U.S. parent com-
176. See Mauntel, supra note 69, at 127.
177. See id.; see also U.S.-Canada Tax Treaty art. XXIV, § 2(b), Sept. 26, 1980, 1986-2 C.B. 258.
178. See Mauntel, supra note 69, at 127.
179. See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
180. IRS, United States Income Tax Treaties-A to Z, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/internationaVarticle/
0,,id=96739,00.htinl (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
181. See id.
182. Amanda Banks, Bahamas Commits to Information Sharing Agreement with United States, TAX-NEWS.COM,
Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.tax-news.cominews/Bahamas-CommitsTo_Information Sharing.Agreement.
With UnitedStates 14475.html.
183. IRS, Tax Treaty Overview, http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/internationalarticle/,,id=
9 64 3 4
,00.
html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
184. See Mauntel, rupra note 69, at 127.
185. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(A) (2011) ("If the sum of foreign base company income (determined without regard
to paragraph (5)) and the gross insurance income for the taxable year is less than the lesser of-(i) 5 percent of
gross income, or (ii) $1,000,000, no part of the gross income for the taxable year shall be treated as foreign
base company income or insurance income.").
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pany report all income from the CFC if the sum of the foreign base company income
exceeds 70% of the U.S. corporation's gross income for the taxable year.186 Corporations
often attempt to undermine these threshold requirements with careful tax planning so that
they can exclude these foreign profits. As previously mentioned, Google's reported reve-
nues totaled $29.3 billion in 2010, of which 52% are attributable to international reve-
nues. 187 Under current application, the "de minimus" provision encourages cross-border
corporations to elude section 954(b)'s reach by establishing a scheme whereby foreign
profits are apportioned among thousands of smaller shell corporations so that each indi-
vidual entity never surfaces above the 5% threshold. Instead of utilizing significant tax-
payer dollars to police this possibility, why not raise the "de minimus" provision to a
"majority" threshold? In other words, a corporation could exclude amounts less than 50%
of the parent-corporation's gross income, and remove the application of section
954(b)(3)(B), which forces the taxpayer to recognize all foreign profits above the 70%
threshold. While, admittedly, any definitive threshold amount would still present oppor-
tunities to avoid U.S. taxation, a 50% threshold would serve a two-fold purpose: 1) it
would properly reflect that percentage of a corporation subject to foreign taxation laws in
their proportionate share of total gross income, and 2) it would increase the tax base of
cross-border corporations by allowing for a larger exclusion and encouraging more corpo-
rations to incorporate within the United States. 88
Under the current tax regime, the Code allows for the shareholder to exclude those
portions of his earnings and profits from his or her taxable income whenever a CFC makes
a distribution to the parent company.189 This system is designed to prevent any ill-effects
of "double taxation" that may occur as a result of the distribution.190 However, the situa-
tion where a U.S. shareholder who owns stock in a foreign-operated corporation that
earns income from non-U.S. sources and concurrently must comply with non-U.S. stan-
dards is subjected to U.S. taxation seems to completely contravene a system that con-
stantly preaches "substance over form."'91 Furthermore, this system simultaneously
relieves a corporate shareholder of the adverse effects of "triple-taxation", in which the
foreign-based earnings of the corporation are subjected to taxation by the foreign jurisdic-
tion and to "double-taxation" at the U.S. corporate and shareholder levels.192
186. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(B) ("If the sum of the foreign base company income ... and the gross insurance
income for the taxable year exceeds 70 percent of gross income, the entire gross income for the taxable year
shall . . . be treated as foreign base company income or insurance income (whichever is appropriate).").
187. Google's 2010 Financial Tables, supra note 159.
188. I.R.C. § 954(b)(3)(B) ("If the sum of the foreign base company income . . . and the gross insurance
income for the taxable year exceeds 70 percent of gross income, the entire gross income for the taxable year
shall . . . be treated as foreign base company income or insurance income (whichever is appropriate).").
189. See I.R.C. § 959(b) ("For purposes of section 95 1(a), the earnings and profits of a controlled foreign
corporation attributable to amounts which are, or have been, included in the gross income of a United States
shareholder under section 951(a), shall not, when distributed through a chain of ownership described under
section 958(a), be also included in the gross income of another controlled foreign corporation in such chain
for purposes of the application of section 951(a) to such other controlled foreign corporation with respect to
such United States shareholder (or to any other United States shareholder who acquires from any person any
portion of the interest of such United States shareholder in the controlled foreign corporation).").
190. See id.
191. Contra I.R.C. § 482.
192. See I.R.C. § 954(a).
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Although there are no current plans by either the House of Representatives or the Sen-
ate to amend the legislation surrounding foreign-based income to ameliorate the effects of
Subpart F income recognition, there have been several attempts by various Members of
Congress to do so.193 While it remains to be seen what the future holds for foreign-based
income, one can certainly expect that corporations like Google will continue to find vari-
ous methods to circumvent the harsh inequities derived from U.S. taxation on income
clearly attributable to transactions where neither party resides within U.S. borders.
V. Conclusion
The United States and other international taxation bodies will certainly face unfavora-
ble outcomes if they continue to expand the reach of their taxation laws to transactions in
which none of the parties directly avail themselves of their domestic protections. While
those jurisdictions claim they have a right to apply their taxation laws to such events, they
simultaneously risk deterring any future direct foreign investment and alienation of their
own domestically-created businesses. As previously mentioned, such ill-effects are already
being felt by the United States as corporations like Google continue to establish and oper-
ate subsidiaries outside U.S. soil to avoid U.S. taxation. One can reasonably assume that
these practices will continue to be implemented. Furthermore, as the United States tries
to close the historically high national deficit, it appears to be economic suicide to continue
to dissuade businesses from operating on a global level for fear that their earnings and
profits will be further decreased by Uncle Sam's greed.
Instead the United States and similar taxation bodies should shift their economic focus
to encouraging investors to expand business operations. As one commentator put it, "[i]t
is better for the United States to abandon taxation on foreign subsidiaries than to continue
the farce of stated taxation that does not actually occur." 94 By allowing these companies
to repatriate the foreign-earned profits back into the United States without fear of high
taxation rates, the economy would reap the benefits, as shareholders would reintroduce
these monies back into the U.S. economy and the Treasury would be able to tax accord-
ingly. As Congress aimlessly continues its search for a more effective substitute for the
previously enacted section 965,195 more domestically-owned corporations will be drawn to
implement measures to increase profit-margins for the benefit of their shareholders.
Ironically, the greedy taxing powers of the United States should heed the words of
Google's corporate slogan-"Don't be evil."
193. See H.R. 5328, 111th Cong. (2010) ("Repeal of Look-Thru Rule for Royalties Received From Con-
trolled Foreign Corporations. Paragraph (6) of section 954(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is
amended-(1) by striking 'rents, and royalties' in subparagraph (A) and inserting 'and rents', and (2) by striking
', rent, or royalty' both places it appears in subparagraph (B) and inserting 'or rent'."); see also S. 45, 112th
Cong. (2011).
194. See Mauntel, supra note 69, at 127.
195. See id. ("Section 965 was helpful as a herald for change in the taxation of international controlled
corporations, but that call was ignored in 2004. Now with the economic crisis in full force, the United States
Congress has a duty to reevaluate the international corporate taxation system, beginning with a reintroduc-
tion of section 965. The financial gains from repatriations will then fuel a more complete overhaul of the
system, closing loopholes which allow transfer of assets abroad and eliminating taxes that other developed
nations have abandoned. These steps will ensure a more effective taxation system and more robust competi-
tion by U.S.-based multinationals.").
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